Risk and career choice: Evidence from Turkey by Caner, A. & Okten, C.
Economics of Education Review 29 (2010) 1060–1075
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Economics of Education Review
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /econedurev
Risk and career choice: Evidence from Turkey
Asena Canera,∗, Cagla Oktenb
a Department of Economics, TOBB-Economics and Technology University, Ankara, Turkey
b Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 15 September 2009
Received in revised form 16 April 2010





a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we examine the college major choice decision in a risk and return frame-
work using university entrance exam data from Turkey. Specifically we focus on the choice
between majors with low income risk such as education and health and others with riskier
income streams. We use a unique dataset that allows us to control for the choice set of
students and parental attitudes towards risk. Our results show that father’s income, self-
employment status and social security status are important factors influencing an individual







© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
It is well documented that college graduates earn signif-
icantly more than high school graduates. Less well known
are the differences in the college premium across majors
and how these differences affect an individual’s decision
on which type of human capital to obtain in college. Invest-
ment in college education allows a person to earn a stream
of labor income depending on the properties of the major
he has chosen. In this way, investment in education is sim-
ilar to a financial investment and is likely to be affected
by return and risk concerns of the investor. In this paper,
we examine the college major choice decision in a risk and
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doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2010.05.006return framework using a nationally representative survey
of university entrance exam applicants from Turkey.
Arcidiacono (2004) points out that large earnings and
ability differences exist across majors, based on the US
data of students’ college major choices in 1972 (their first
year in college) and 1974 and their reported earnings in
1986. He finds that large earnings differences exist even
after controlling for self-selection according to ability. Saks
and Shore (2005) argue that there may be major specific
idiosyncratic risk if agents do not know their ability before
entering a career and if differences in ability cause disper-
sion in wages.
In many developing countries, there is also significant
macro-level unemployment risk due to periodic economic
crises in addition to labor income risk due to individual
differences in ability. Yet, those employed in the public
sector are subject to a much smaller unemployment risk
than those employed in the private sector. For example,
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nd health are largely employed by the public sector where
mployees are rarely fired or laid off (Ministry of Education,
inistry of Health1 (2008)). Economic theory tells us that
gents would require a premium to enter into careers that
hey perceive as riskier. However, richer individuals should
emand smaller risk premiums and consequently be more
illing to choose riskier careers.
Saks and Shore (2005) analyze the major choice deci-
ion in a risk and return framework using US data and
nd that wealthier individuals are more likely to choose
iskier majors such as business. Our paper contributes to
his small literature by advancing the analysis in several
imensions: first, we consider differences in macro-level
nemployment risk in addition to wage income risk due to
ndividual differences in ability.
Second we allow for parental influences when measur-
ng the effect of parental income on major choice. We use
ather’s self-employment and social security status vari-
bles to measure the effects of parental preferences. The
urkish social security system offers different programs
o public and private sector employees. This character-
stic enables us to identify fathers who have chosen a
ublic sector career. Third, we fully control for the uni-
ersity/major choice set available to the student as the
niversity entrance exam (OSS) score is the only determi-
ant of university/major placement in Turkey. Researchers
ho work with US data use SAT scores, which are infor-
ative of students’ choice sets but do not completely
etermine the available choices, since other factors such
s extracurricular activities, essays and even demographic
haracteristics such as race and income also play a role.
Finally, ours is the first econometric study on a develop-
ng country that examines the influence of parental income
n college major choice. The impact of income and risk on
areer choice has important policy implications for devel-
ping countries that have significant income inequalities.
oor students may be systematically more likely to avoid
isky human capital investments, even if these investments
ntail high expected personal returns. This dynamic may
urther perpetuate the existing income inequality within
society. Furthermore, to the extent that high personal
eturns also imply high social returns, it may be efficient for
overnments to provide larger subsidies for these invest-
ents to poor students.
Our main finding is that parental income, father’s self-
mployment status and social security status are important
eterminants of choosing a riskier major such as busi-
ess over a less risky one such as education, controlling
or the OSS score and other socio-economic characteris-
ics. Controlling for university preferences in a university
xed effects specification, we find that a 100% increase in
arental income increases the relative probability of major-ng in business over education by 64%. A change in father’s
tatus to self-employment increases the relative probabil-
ty of majoring in business over education by 49%. A student
hose father belongs to the public sector social security
1 Relevant statistics are acquired from these ministries via formal
equests or from their websites when possible. More information on this
s provided in Section 5.n Review 29 (2010) 1060–1075 1061
system is 47% less likely to choose business major over
education. Hence we find strong evidence that income is a
very important factor in increasing a student’s probability
of choosing a riskier major over a less risky one controlling
for father’s job preferences.
Isolating the exact mechanisms through which parental
income may affect choice of riskier majors such as business
is challenging. In the presence of unobserved hetero-
geneity, parental income might proxy for unobserved
parental resources such as social and business networks
or parental risk and job preferences. We include father’s
self-employment and social security status in order to con-
trol for these unobserved characteristics. In addition, we
control for the population of the town that the student
comes from to measure for the size of these important
networks. Despite our efforts to control for unobserved
heterogeneity, we should add a caveat that there might be
other channels through which parental income might influ-
ence the choice of a riskier major. Nevertheless, our finding
that high return high-risk majors are chosen by those with
rich and self-employed parents has important implications
for intergenerational income mobility and transmission of
income risk. In other words, we provide strong evidence for
the intergenerational transmission of intra-generational
mobility and this result in and of itself is worthy of atten-
tion.
The plan for our paper is as follows: in the next sec-
tion we summarize the related literature. In Section 3, we
describe the university entrance exam system in Turkey.
Section 4 builds the theoretical framework of the paper. In
Section 5, we explain how we determine labor income risk
in Turkey. After describing the data in Section 6 and the
econometric model in Section 7, we discuss the results of
our study in Section 8. Section 9 concludes our paper.
2. Related literature
There is a large literature on estimating the mone-
tary returns to college education. The standard approach
to measure these returns is a Mincer equation which
regresses income on educational attainment as well as
other demographic characteristics. Prominent examples
are Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) and Angrist and
Krueger (1991). In Turkey, returns to education are found
to be the highest at the university level in 1987 (Tansel,
1994). In 1989, returns to university education of wage-
earner men are comparable to those of self-employed men
(Tansel, 2001). In 1994, returns to university education are
higher in the private sector than in the public sector (Tansel,
2005).
A related body of literature examines the problem of
choosing the optimum quantity of educational investment.
Becker (1964) observes that since human capital is both
risky and illiquid it should demand a premium over safer
assets. Levhari and Weiss (1974), Williams (1979) and Judd
(2000) model the decision about what quantity of educa-
tion to receive when investment in education is risky.
There are relatively few papers that examine the link
between type of major and returns to major choice. Boskin
(1974) finds that an occupation with higher lifetime earn-
ings and lower training costs is more likely to be chosen.
Education Review 29 (2010) 1060–1075
Table 1a
Programs compatible with the TM field.
Major Programs
1. Education Kindergarten education, mathematics
education, philosophy education, education of
the visually impaired
2. Business Banking and finance, tourism management,
insurance, international finance, international
trade, logistics, accounting
3. Econ-Pol-IR Economics, political science, public finance,
international relations, public administration,
European Union relations
4. Social Sciences Anthropology, philosophy, sociology,
psychology
5. Law Law
6. Literature Turkish language and literature
Source: OSYM (2002).
Table 1b
Programs compatible with the Science field.
Major Programs
1. Education Kindergarten education, mathematics
education, philosophy education, education of
the visually impaired, computer education
2. Business Business
3. Econ-Pol-IR Economics, econometrics
4. Engineering All engineering programs
5. Science Physics, chemistry, biology, genetics,
with the TM and the Science fields, respectively. We focus
on these fields since the majors we want to analyze such
as business and health are more likely to be chosen by1062 A. Caner, C. Okten / Economics of
Berger (1988) finds predicted future earnings influence the
college major choice of young men. Neither of these papers
analyzes the differential impact of initial (family) income
on different careers.
Saks and Shore (2005) examine how the financial risk
associated with different careers influences career choice
using the US data. In their model, individuals demand a
premium to enter careers with more idiosyncratic risk.
However, if agents have DARA (decreasing absolute risk
aversion) preferences, the required size of the premium
falls with family wealth. Hence, controlling for ability and
preferences, wealthier individuals should demand smaller
risk premiums and be more eager to choose riskier careers.
They analyze students who have already chosen their
majors and use SAT scores to control for students’ choice
set. They control for neither parents’ self-employment sta-
tus nor sector of employment.
In the major choice decision, parental characteristics
may have an important role along with risk and return char-
acteristics of careers that are related to the chosen majors.
There is strong evidence for intergenerational transmission
of occupational status (Kerckhoff, Campbell, & Winfield-
Laird, 1985; Nguyen & Haile, 2003). Carmichael (2000) finds
that the occupational attainment of sons depends signifi-
cantly on the socio-economic status of their fathers.
Liu, Chou, and Liu (2006) and Tansel (2002) show
that parents’ income and education levels have important
positive effects on children’s educational achievements.
There is evidence that parents’ risk attitudes are corre-
lated to those of their children (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman,
& Sunde, 2006). The transmission of risk attitudes could
work through various channels; genetics, child learning
by imitation, or deliberate efforts by parents to shape the
preferences and beliefs of their children.
Also related to our study is the literature on the effect
of parental characteristics on entrepreneurship. It is well
known that the children of the self-employed display a
greater propensity to become entrepreneurs. One expla-
nation of this phenomenon is that starting up a business
requires capital. Successful entrepreneurs help ease the
financial constraints of their children by transferring funds
to them. Evans and Leighton (1989) find that assets have
an important role in men’s transition to self-employment.
Another explanation is that parents transmit to the children
their work experience, reputation and other managerial
human capital. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) find that the
parents’ strongest influence comes from the transmission
of their own self-employment experience and secrets to
business success. These findings suggest that the occupa-
tional status of the parents may have an influence on the
children’s career choice and thus should be included in the
analysis.
3. The setting: the university entrance exam in
TurkeyStudents who wish to receive university education are
required to take a nationwide test called the OSS (can be
translated as “Student Selection Exam”). The OSS is a highly
competitive national event. It is given once a year and more
than 1 million students participate each year. In 2003, “ofastronomy
6. Health Medicine, dentistry, nursing, veterinary,
midwifery
Source: OSYM (2002).
those taking the examination only 21.5% was placed in a
2 or 4 year university program. About two-thirds of those
taking the examination were repeat takers while one-third
were fresh high school graduates sitting in the examination
for the first time” (Tansel & Bircan, 2005, p. 2).
The exam is composed of different sections. Students
decide which sections to answer based on their major
choices. In 2002, the year that our data was collected, the
OSS had two main sections (verbal and quantitative) and a
foreign language section. The raw OSS score was a weighted
average of the scores on these sections.
The raw OSS scores were further adjusted for high
school performance. In Turkey, high school students choose
fields of study. In the 2002 data provided by the Student
Selection and Placement Center (OSYM), there were four
fields; Science, Turkish-Math (TM), Social Sciences and For-
eign Languages.2 As part of a policy to encourage students
to choose programs that are compatible with their high
school fields, a bigger adjustment factor was used if the
chosen programs were compatible with the high school
field.
We report in Tables 1a and 1b lists of programs that are
compatible with students who graduate from high schoolstudents who come from these fields. We match these
2 To be precise, there were two other fields, namely arts and theology,

















































has and the number of hours of tutoring that the student
received before taking the exam, since these variables also
indicate the extent to which the student is supported by
his family financially.
3 If career c yields unambiguously higher income than career c′ then
we say that Yc first order stochastically dominates Yc′ . If career c second






F(Yc′ )dYc′ for all
income levels y, where F(.) indicates the cumulative distribution func-
tion. By definition, first order stochastic dominance implies second orderA. Caner, C. Okten / Economics of
rograms to majors according to their risk and return char-
cteristics, based on the groupings that we observe in the
iterature and the characteristics of the Turkish labor mar-
et described in Section 5.
Students who scored above a certain threshold were
sked to submit their choice lists. Each candidate could
nclude up to 24 choices (program-university pairs) in the
ist, ranked from the most preferred to the least preferred.
he candidate with the highest OSS score was admitted to
he first program in his choice list. As the quotas of the most
opular programs were filled, candidates with lower OSS
cores were assigned to their less preferred programs, or to
o programs at all if the quotas of all the programs in their
hoice lists had already been filled.
. Theoretical framework
.1. Model
In this section we build on the theoretical framework
f Saks and Shore (2005) who model individual differ-
nces in ability as the cause of variability in labor income
treams and argue that certain majors such as business
ave more variable income streams than others. Our focus
ere is on differences in variability of labor income streams
cross majors that lead to private sector versus public sec-
or employment. In addition to individual differences in
bility that lead to more variable incomes in the private
ector, we model macro-level unemployment risk as an
mportant factor that adds to this variation.
We assume that the utility functions of parents and off-
prings are functions of the financial resources that the
ndividual has access to and job characteristics. In particu-
ar, let the utility of individual i from choosing career c be
enoted by:
i





here Wo is initial wealth which is the bequest from par-
nts and Yic is labor income of individual i from career c.
he  parameter represents non-pecuniary characteristics
f a career. These characteristics can be number of work-
ng hours, flexibility of hours, working conditions, social
tatus of the job and the public versus private nature of the
ob. We will assume that the preferences for non-pecuniary
haracteristics of parent and offspring are correlated.
We assume that agents are risk-averse when they make





wpubc , if public
wpric , if private
. (2)
Labor incomes earned in public and private sector jobs
an be expressed as:
pub
c = w̄pubc , (3a)
pri
c = w̄pric + ˛i + c, (3b)
here ˛i represents variation in earnings in private sector
ue to differences in individual ability, drawn from a dis-
ribution with zero mean and variance 2˛. The underlyingn Review 29 (2010) 1060–1075 1063
assumption is that ability can have an effect on earnings
in the private sector while it has no effect in the pub-
lic sector. While this may be an oversimplification, it is
true that earnings in the public sector do not vary much
and depend almost entirely on seniority. A very talented
teacher and an untalented one of equal rank are likely to get
the same salary. Individuals do not have perfect informa-
tion on their ability when they choose a career. Important
for our analysis, we assume that ˛P and ˛0 are corre-
lated; i.e. the abilities of the parent and the offspring are
correlated.
In Eq. (3b), c represents variation in earnings in private
sector career c due to the unknown nature of employ-
ment (for instance, due to risks originating from changes
in supply and demand conditions). We refer to this as
macroeconomic unemployment risk. Since public sector
employees are almost never laid off, they do not bear this
risk. We assume that c is drawn from a distribution with
mean zero and variance 2c .
We consider career c to be safer than career c′ if
Yc second order stochastically dominates Yc′ .3 All risk-
averse expected utility maximizers prefer a second order
stochastically dominant career to a dominated one. There-
fore, expected labor income in the private sector, w̄pric ,
should be high enough to compensate for ability risk
and career-specific labor income risk, otherwise no risk-
averse agent would ever prefer the private sector. If
in addition to risk aversion we assume that agents
have decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA4), agents
become less concerned about specific risks as they get
richer.5
4.2. Determinants of career choice
4.2.1. Risk preferences
An important determinant of career choice is the risk
preference of an individual. One reason why individuals
might differ in their degrees of risk aversion is differences
in their access to financial resources. As we mentioned
before, richer agents are more eager than poorer agents
to undertake risky careers, ceteris paribus. In our empirical
framework, we will use family income as the indicator of
wealth bequest that the individual receives from his family.
We also control for the number of siblings that the studentstochastic dominance, but not vice versa.
4 DARA preferences are such that the coefficient of absolute risk aver-
sion r(Y) = − U′′(Y)
U′(Y) is decreasing. An example of such a utility function
is U = ln (Y). We should also note that both experimental and empirical
evidence seem to support DARA preferences. See for example Levy (1994).
5 Saks and Shore (2005) provide a proof of this statement.
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4.2.2. Job preferences
Another important determinant of career choice is an
individual’s job preferences. Some individuals seek inde-
pendence and enjoy being self-employed, while others
enjoy well-specified working hours. Preferences for work-
ing conditions or the social status associated with the job
can also vary across individuals. We assume that job pref-
erences might be transferred across generations through
the inheritance of genes, information and social networks.
In our empirical framework, we use father’s self-
employment status and father’s social security status
variables as indicators of parents’ job preferences which
might be transferred to their offspring. We therefore expect
students whose fathers are self-employed to choose a
major such as business. We expect those whose fathers
belong to the public sector social security system to choose
majors that lead to employment in the public sector.
It is plausible that women have different job prefer-
ences than men, due to their responsibilities at home. For
example, women may prefer teaching due to more flexible
hours. Women and men might also differ in their attitudes
towards risk.6 Therefore, in our empirical model, we con-
trol for the gender of the student.
The population of the area that a student comes from
might also affect his major choice. Since private sector jobs
are scarce in small towns, we expect the business networks
of those that come from small towns to be limited. Even if
these students consider living in big cities after graduation,
they may lack the necessary social networks that will help
them find jobs in the private sector. As a result students
from small towns may be more likely to choose majors such
as education and health. To control for this effect, we use
in our empirical specification the population of the area in
which the student went to high school.
4.2.3. Ability
Ability can play a role in sorting individuals into differ-
ent careers. OSS score is a measure of scholastic aptitude
and we hypothesize that it is likely to be correlated with
ability that determines future earnings. Within the OSS sys-
tem, students know their scores before they make their
choices, and we expect students with higher scores to
choose riskier careers that yield higher expected income.
In Turkey, students often take the OSS multiple times
before they can manage to get a score that makes place-
ment possible. Hence we control for the number of times
that the individual has taken the OSS as an indicator of
experience with the exam and as another indicator of abil-
ity. While the average repeat taker might have lower ability
than the average first-timer, he has more experience with
the exam and possibly a longer time to prepare for it. Hence
the expected sign on this variable is theoretically ambigu-
ous.
As stated before, individuals do not have perfect infor-
mation on their ability. They learn about it over time,
after they have chosen and perhaps started practicing their
6 There is evidence that women exhibit greater risk aversion in their
financial decisions than men. See for example, Jianakoplos and Bernasek
(1998).on Review 29 (2010) 1060–1075
careers. In this model, father’s education may be an indica-
tor of the offspring’s true ability as abilities are correlated
across generations. Thus, we use father’s education level to
control for the possible transmission of ability from parent
to offspring.
4.2.4. Credit constraints
Students with credit constraints may choose majors
with lower education costs or with better fellow-
ship/scholarship opportunities. In Turkey, the Ministry of
Education offers scholarships to increase the supply of
teachers. This program supports a number of students (the
quota may change yearly but it was between 1000 and 2000
in years 2000–2004) who specify an education program
within their top five choices and who are admitted to one
of these programs, by providing them with a scholarship
during their studies with a condition to work in the public
sector after graduation. This incentive may have influenced
the major choices of credit constrained students. We test
for this possibility as part of our robustness checks.
5. Estimating labor income risk
In Turkey, there is macro-level unemployment risk due
to periodic economic crises as well as labor income risk due
to individual differences in ability. Certain majors such as
education and health are perceived to be safer than others
in terms of macro-level unemployment risk.
According to our estimates based on a 5% representative
sample of Turkish 2000 Census (Turkish Statistical Insti-
tution (TUIK), 2000) unemployment rates of teachers and
physicians are much lower than those of other occupations.
TUIK asks each respondent about his employment status
and current occupation if the respondent is in the labor
force. Table 2 shows the mean and the standard deviation
of the unemployment rates7 of various occupations as well
as the number of observations in each category. The fig-
ures support our thesis that careers in teaching and medical
professions are more secure than others.
While only 4.71% of teachers and 6.60% of medical
professionals are reported as unemployed, about 8% of
accountants and managers (retail and wholesale indus-
tries), 13.96% of economists, 13.98% of physicists and
chemists and 11.49% of engineers are unemployed. We
have conducted tests to examine whether the average
unemployment rates of teachers are different from those of
accountants, managers or economists and found the differ-
ences in means to be statistically different at 1% significance
level. We have also found that the average unemployment
rate of medical professionals is statistically different from
that of engineers or physicists and chemists again at 1% sig-
nificance level. These findings provide strong evidence on
the relatively low unemployment rates of careers in teach-
ing and medical professions. We should note that these
rates precede the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey where
there were massive layoffs from financial and manufactur-
ing sectors that are likely to increase differences between
7 For each occupation, we compute the unemployment rate by dividing
the number of unemployed by the size of the labor force in that occupation.
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Table 2
Occupation specific unemployment rates.
Mean Standard deviation Cell size
Teachers 0.0471 0.2118 30,122
Lawyers and other legal professionals 0.0631 0.2432 3,027
Medical professionals 0.0660 0.2483 9,074
Accountants 0.0789 0.2696 3,574
Managers (retail, wholesale) 0.0814 0.2739 278










































The Ministry of Health provides data on the average net
wages of health personnel in the public sector by profession
(Ministry of Health, 2005). According to these data, aver-
age monthly net wages in 2004 were 700 for nurses and
9 The numbers of first-time hires (i.e. those who never worked
before as a public school teacher) were provided by the Ministry of
Education, Personnel Department upon our formal request. The data
on the number of graduates come from the Higher Education Statis-
tics on the Student Selection and Placement Center (OSYM) website
(http://www.osym.gov.tr/BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFFAAF6AA
849816B2EF8F59EC4393613791). Graduates of earlier years can of course
apply for a public school teaching job.
10 For the years 2000–2002, we do not have data on first-time hires since
we have been provided only with the total number of teacher hires, which
includes location transfers, those who quit teaching some time ago and
returned and so on. According to data from years 2003–2009, first-time
hires constituted 80–95% of total hires. Therefore, we can say that the
bulk of total hires is first-time hires. As before, the data for the number of
graduates come from OSYM, years 2001, 2002, 2003.Statisticians, mathematicians 0.1226
Economists 0.1396
Physicists, chemists 0.1398
ource: Authors’ calculations from 5% sample of Turkish 2000 Census (TU
nemployment rates of teachers (medical professionals)
nd business (engineering) majors.
Hence we argue that, if education and health degrees are
ore likely to shelter an individual from unemployment
isk then we would expect agents with higher risk aversion
o choose these majors.
Studies based on survey data point out that job secu-
ity is an important factor in choosing careers in teaching
nd medicine. Ovet (2006) surveys students enrolled in
he Faculty of Education at Eskisehir Osmangazi University
nd finds that the top two reasons for choosing the educa-
ion major are non-pecuniary returns such as being fond of
hildren and search for job and retirement security.8
Based on a survey of medical school students, Alper and
zdemir (2004) report that the “employment guarantee
actor” is the second most important reason for choosing
edical school after the “willingness to help others” factor
hich is ranked the first.
The public sector is the largest employer of teach-
rs and health personnel in Turkey where public sector
mployees are rarely fired or laid off. Currently there are
22,864 teachers employed in the public education system
nd only 34,321 teachers employed by private teach-
ng institutions (Ministry of Education, February 2008,
ttp://personel.meb.gov.tr). According to the latest statis-
ics released by the Ministry of Health, 81% of doctors, 85%
f nurses and 93% of midwives are employed by the public
ector (Ministry of Health, 2008).
Graduates with education or health degrees have a
igher chance of being employed in the public sector,
ompared to graduates of other majors. About 48% of the
,632,482 civil servants employed by the central govern-
ent (the bulk of public sector employees) are employed
n the education (35%) and the health sector (13%) (Guler,
003). Out of the 189,491 students who graduated from
urkish universities in the 2002–2003 academic year,
9.65% had an education degree and only 7.43% had a
ealth related degree (authors’ calculations based on the
tatistics provided by the Turkish Council of Higher Educa-
ion (YOK)). These numbers allow us to draw a distinction:
hile only 27.08% of graduates have education or health
egrees, teachers and health personnel constitute 48% of
ivil servants. These two fields are clearly overrepresented
n public sector employment.
8 The other two factors were not having a high enough score to major




The students in our dataset made their major choice in
2002. To estimate the chances of an education faculty grad-
uate to be hired as a public school teacher, we compare
the number of first-time hires to the number of graduates
in (or close to) 2002.9 Strikingly, in the years 2000–2002,
the number of total hires exceeded the number of gradu-
ates of Education Faculties by 14–48%.10 In these years, it
appears that teachers had a very good chance of finding a
public sector job. During the years 2003–2008, the ratio of
the number of first-time hires to the number of graduates
varies from 48 to 77% implying that an Education Faculty
graduate still had a good chance of being employed in the
public sector.11
While the wages of public school teachers vary accord-
ing to rank, seniority, type of school, the variance is not
large. The monthly (net) wages are between 800 and 1600
US dollars for teachers of all ranks and types (information
provided by the Ministry of Education, Personnel Depart-
ment, upon formal request). For a starting teacher, it is not
even realistic to talk about a wage variance in the public
school sector.1211 In recent years, getting a public school teaching job has become
increasingly more competitive partly due to a combination of an increase
in the supply of education faculty graduates and a decrease in hires and
partly due to a shift in public policy that allowed graduates of other majors
become public school teachers after completing a Master’s program in
pedagogy.
12 Actually this is true for all public sector employees as they are offered
the same wages at the entry level (i.e. no variation due to ability) and
modest rates of wage raises by rank.
1066 A. Caner, C. Okten / Economics of Education Review 29 (2010) 1060–1075
Table 3a
Descriptive statistics of the survey data on Bilkent University graduates.
Frequency Percent of the sample
Sex Male 375 55.0
Female 307 45.0














Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey of Bilkent University gr
midwives, 900 for pharmacists, 1100 for medical doctors,13
all expressed in US dollars. There is not much variation by
rank. An important source of earnings variation is extra
payments made by revolving funds at some hospitals that
can amount to 400–550$ for nurses and 1000–2500$ for
medical doctors.
We have established that job security is an important
characteristic of careers in education and health. Next,
we look at the wage differences across other majors to
determine which of these majors have higher income risk.
Unfortunately, there are no major specific wage data avail-
able for Turkey. Hence we conducted a survey among the
graduates of Bilkent University.14 Within an occupation,
cross-sectional differences in wages is one measure of labor
income risk, however it is an imperfect measure since the
cross-sectional dispersion in wages cannot differentiate
unobserved heterogeneity from risk. If people know their
ability before entering a career, then the cross-sectional
dispersion of wages will overestimate the degree of risk.
In the survey, we asked questions on the sex, age,
department of graduation, years of experience in current
job, years of experience in previous jobs, father’s education
level and monthly net compensation (i.e. net income plus
any subsidies) of salaried and wage earning respondents.15
13 We prefer to exclude medical specialists from the earnings compari-
son as being a specialist requires extra training after a university degree. In
Turkey, medical school is an undergraduate school whose graduates can
either work as medical doctors or study an extra 3–5 years and become
specialists.
14 Bilkent University is a prestigious private university in Turkey. It
enrolls about 12,000 students and has strong alumni/ae contacts, which
enabled us to conduct our survey. However, it does not offer any educa-
tion or health programs, therefore we cannot obtain any information on
the riskiness of these fields based on these data.
15 The respondents filled out the surveys without revealing their iden-
tity. Hence we do not have any reason to expect that response rate will
depend on income. We requested the respondents to choose from a set of
income brackets.682
.
We use the survey data that we collected to examine the
compensation differences among salaried or wage workers
who graduated from departments that coincide with the
categories in our analysis. As shown in Table 3a, we have
682 observations. The breakdown of graduates according to
sex, age and majors is shown in the table. The advantages of
our survey data are that the respondents are mostly young,
meaning that they are less likely to know their abilities, and
that we can control for observable measures of ability.
Using these data, we compute and report in Table 3b, the
unconditional and conditional means and standard devi-
ations of monthly compensation by college major along
with the minimum and maximum values. The “uncondi-
tional” statistics are directly observed in the cross-section.
To remove at least some part of the dispersion in cross-
sectional wages that is due to unobserved heterogeneity
rather than risk, we control for individual and parental
characteristics via an OLS regression. The descriptive statis-
tics of the residuals from this regression are what we report
as “conditional” in the table.
Based on the statistics reported in Table 3b, we can com-
pare business majors to Econ-Pol-IR majors. Given that the
incomes of business majors are higher in both mean and
variance, and mean income is low relative to standard devi-
ation, we conjecture that business careers can be regarded
as riskier careers. More important to our study, business,
Econ-Pol-IR and engineering careers entail higher risk com-
pared to education and health.16 Although we do not have
the data to perform a similar analysis, we can make a judg-
ment based on what we know about careers in health and
education. The net monthly wages of teachers are between
16 We should note that the cross-sectional differences between means of
income across individuals may also reflect differences in jobs themselves
such as the hours and working conditions in addition to a compensating
differential for the unemployment risk. Hence Table 3b provides sugges-
tive but not conclusive evidence on ranking majors according to income
risk.
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Table 3b
Descriptive statistics of monthly compensation by college major (in US dollars).
Unconditional Conditional N
Min Max Mean Standard deviation Min Max Mean Standard deviation
Business 623 8480 2670 1889 −3390 5068 69 1389 165
Econ-Pol-IR 623 8480 2071 1298 −3915 6848 −285 1236 291
Engineering 1023 8480 3169 1962 −4302 5931 316 1427 226
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey of Bilkent University graduates.
Note: In the “conditional” part of the table we report the descriptive statistics of residuals from an OLS regression of monthly compensation on sex (1: male,












































mitted dummy is no education). We report the full regression results in t
hat those who are “Econ-Pol-IR” graduates earn on average 285$ less than
nd in Table A1.
00 and 1600 US dollars as reported earlier, while the
ncome range for business majors is much wider. Further-
ore, the average income of a business major in our data
s higher than that of teacher. Given all these observations,
e conjecture that a business career has higher income risk
nd a higher expected return than an education career.
It is possible to make a similar comparison of health
o engineering based on the statistics in Table 3b. The
xpected income for an engineer is higher and the
ncome range for engineers is much wider compared to
ealth personnel. As reported earlier, average monthly net
arnings of health personnel are 1200 for nurses and mid-
ives and 2500 for medical doctors, both expressed in
S dollars.
. The data
The 2002 data provided by the OSYM of Turkey con-
ains one random sample from each of the four high
chool fields; Science, Turkish-Math (TM), Social Sciences
nd Foreign Languages. Each sample contains data on
bout 40,000 students. Since students who choose busi-
ess programs are mostly from the TM field, the TM
ataset is very suitable for estimating the relative risk
atio of choosing the business major over the education
ajor. The Science dataset contains students who are
ostly interested in engineering and health; it is there-
ore suitable for examining the choice between health
nd other fields such as engineering and natural sci-
nces.
For each student, we have data on his/her OSS scores,
igh school performance measure, student’s choice list
hich is a ranking of program-university pairs. Our dataset
lso includes information on family and individual charac-
eristics such as the gender of the student, the number of
iblings, education of the parents, employment and social
ecurity status of the parents, family income, whether
nd for how long the student received private tutor-
ng to prepare for the exam, the number of times that
he student has taken the exam and population of the
rea that student attended high school. The data on the
ocio-economic background of the students were col-
ected via a survey of the students registering to take the
SS.
We merged the survey data with the list of pro-
rams in universities to which placement is made viandix Table A1. The number −285 in the conditional mean column means
rage (mean) earner in the sample, controlling for the factors listed above
the OSS system. With this merge, we are able to iden-
tify all programs that a particular student chooses. Since
we are interested in major choice, we restricted the data
to the students who specified at least one program in
their choice lists. Hence our sample size drops to about
11,000 with this restriction. Further, we exclude students
who listed Open University or evening programs as their
first choice since these students might already have jobs
and careers. This restricts the TM data to about 6500
observations and the Science data to about 9000 observa-
tions.
In 2002, there were 76 universities (including both pri-
vate and public) in Turkey, with more than a total of 3000
departments offering about a hundred different 4-year
degree programs. Since it is not feasible to analyze the
choice decision among such a large number of programs,
we group the relevant programs into majors as shown in
Tables 1a and 1b.
The descriptive statistics of our samples are reported in
Tables 4a and 4b. A glance at these tables shows us that
family income is the highest for students who chose busi-
ness major and the lowest for education major. Father’s
self-employment rate is the highest for those who chose
business. Father’s private social security holding is most
common among those who chose business, Econ-Pol-IR,
law and engineering majors. Father’s education is higher
for those who chose business than those who preferred
education major. A higher percentage of those who chose
business are male, relative to education. Those who chose
education come from larger families, as indicated by the
number of siblings. Furthermore, population and tutoring
hours are the lowest for those who chose education. In
sum, the students who chose education come from smaller
residential areas; they have larger families and lower fam-
ily income, when compared to the students who chose a
riskier major such as business.
7. Empirical framework
We use a multinomial logit model to examine the
impact of income and other variables on college major
choice. We take a student’s top choice of an undergraduate
major as an indication of his career choice. In the multi-
nomial logit framework, the utility that student i receives
from choosing major c when faced with C choices, is a














Descriptive statistics of the OSS data (Turkish-Math field).















Education 341.58 0.30 0.28 0.84 4.15 0.42 3.23 235.84 1.97 130.95 540,161
n = 3284 4.49 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 4.95 0.02 0.13 10,881
125 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 100.612 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 5 1500 5 159.456 1,500,000
Business 708.26 0.43 0.23 0.93 5.06 0.67 2.52 376.48 1.86 133.81 1,001,813
n = 608 25.35 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.04 14.62 0.04 0.43 25,943
125 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 107.274 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 5 1500 5 165.106 1,500,000
Econ-Pol-IR 611.03 0.31 0.29 0.90 4.93 0.63 2.67 377.88 1.86 134.96 984,986
n = 868 17.75 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 11.64 0.03 0.35 21,782
125 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 102.701 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 5 1500 5 168.443 1,500,000
Law 610.24 0.32 0.38 0.89 5.21 0.51 2.75 402.31 1.49 139.39 741,126
n = 779 18.53 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 12.22 0.03 0.33 237,29
125 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 105.029 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 5 1500 5 164.646 1,500,000
Social Sciences 619.62 0.33 0.26 0.86 4.81 0.39 2.73 312.33 2.13 128.78 943,237
n = 604 24.11 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.05 13.64 0.04 0.43 26,626
125 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 102.378 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 5 1500 5 167.396 1,500,000
Literature 404.78 0.30 0.23 0.82 4.22 0.37 3.09 268.77 2.15 126.04 747,789
n = 277 21.85 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.07 19.82 0.06 0.43 40,260
125 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 105.614 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 5 1500 5 154.405 1,500,000
Total n = 6420 474.22 0.32 0.28 0.86 4.54 0.48 2.98 297.18 1.91 132.37 715,288
5.58 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 4.01 0.01 0.12 8,318
125 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 100.612 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 5 1500 5 168.443 1,500,000














Descriptive statistics of the OSS data (science field).












Times exam taken University
exam score
Population
Education 335.80 0.26 0.33 0.82 4.31 0.49 2.22 326.56 1.64 144.46 501,543
n = 1977 5.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 6.90 0.02 0.27 13,281
125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 103.292 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 4 1500 5 180.63 1,500,000
Business 765.26 0.37 0.32 0.91 5.56 0.62 1.60 479.54 1.40 147.44 977,178
n = 303 35.40 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.06 18.27 0.04 0.95 36,530
125 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 108.92 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 4 1500 3 178.747 1,500,000
Econ-Pol-IR 694.35 0.25 0.34 0.89 5.47 0.60 1.49 420.89 1.57 147.10 1,046,353
n = 146 41.68 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.08 28.99 0.06 1.51 49,812
125 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 108.126 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 4 1500 3 181.182 1,500,000
Engineering 600.29 0.29 0.36 0.90 5.35 0.80 1.60 447.90 1.46 155.26 876,436
n = 2807 9.66 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 6.37 0.01 0.31 12,275
125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 108.065 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 4 1500 3 184.264 1,500,000
Science 476.03 0.29 0.29 0.84 4.63 0.54 1.81 384.85 1.82 138.28 893,236
n = 1168 11.44 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 10.16 0.02 0.41 19,185
125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 105.326 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 4 1500 3 180.824 1,500,000
Health 447.70 0.25 0.41 0.88 5.02 0.48 1.91 404.46 1.48 154.71 639,504
n = 2524 6.66 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 6.43 0.01 0.32 12,518
125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 103.893 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 4 1500 3 182.398 1,500,000
Total 489.43 0.28 0.36 0.87 4.94 0.60 1.85 401.11 1.55 150.09 734,786
n = 8925 4.43 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 3.50 0.01 0.17 6,906
125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 103.292 2,500
2500 1 1 1 9 1 4 1500 5 184.264 1,500,000
Note: The statistics listed are the mean, standard deviation, minimum and the maximum, from top to bottom, respectively, for each cell.
Educati
is consistent with our theoretical framework that ability
increases returns to a career in the private sector.
In addition to its impact on the probability of choosing
business major – a natural candidate for someone aspiring
17 Tansel (2005) used a specification similar to including self employ-
ment and social security status of the father. In a multinomial model1070 A. Caner, C. Okten / Economics of
student chooses major c, we assume that Uic is the max-
imum among C utilities. Hence the statistical model is
driven by the probability that choice c is made, which can
be written as Prob (Uic > U
i
k
) for all k /= c.
Let Z be a random variable indicating the choice made.
If the C disturbances are independent and identically dis-
tributed with Weibull distribution F(εic) = exp (e−εic ), then





(1 + ∑CK=1eˇ′kxi ) , for c = 1, 2, . . . C.









The model implies that we can compute C (five in our
study) relative risk ratios Pric/Pri0 = eˇ
′
cxi . The coefficients
reported in Tables 5a and 5b in the results section are eˇ
′
c
and indicate how the relative risk ratios change in response
to an increase in x.
The x matrix includes the characteristics of the student
and his family. As explained in the theoretical framework
section, we predict students coming from wealthier fami-
lies to choose riskier careers. Therefore, we include in the
x matrix the logarithm of family income (income (ln)) as
the indicator of wealth bequest that the individual receives
from his family. We also include the number of siblings that
the student has (no. of siblings) and the hours of tutoring
that the student received before taking the exam (tutor-
ing hours), since these variables are also indicators of the
extent to which the student is supported by his family
financially.
The x matrix includes father’s self-employment status
(father self-employed), defined as a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if self-employed or owns his business
and 0 otherwise. According to the Turkish social security
system, a person is either covered by the public sector pro-
gram (called Emekli Sandigi), covered by a private sector
program (called SSK or Bag-kur), or not covered at all. We
therefore define two social security dummy variables. The
“Father public ss” dummy is equal to 1 if father is covered
by the public sector employees program and 0 otherwise.
The “Father private ss” dummy takes the value of 1 if father
is covered by private sector social security program and 0
otherwise. As explained in the theory section, father’s self-
employment and social security status variables control for
job preferences transmitted from parent to child.
To control for the possibility that women have differ-
ent job preferences than men, we include in our regression
a dummy variable (male) that is equal to 1 for men and 0
for women. Another control variable is the logarithm of the
population of the area in which the student went to high
school (population (ln)). This variable is included to con-
trol for the possibility that students coming from smaller
towns have different job preferences. It is well known that
in Turkey university characteristics such as location and
reputation influence students program-university choices.
Hence we also present results where we control for dum-
mies over seventy universities.on Review 29 (2010) 1060–1075
To control for student’s ability, we include in our regres-
sion the “OSS score” of the student, as explained in the
theoretical framework section. We also include the “Times
exam taken” variable. “Father’s education” is included to
control for the possible transmission of ability from parent
to child. In order to see whether career choice decisions
are guided by credit constraints rather than the channels
predicted by our theory, we include as part of our robust-
ness checks a dummy variable for being credit constrained
which is equal to 1 if the student indicated that he plans to
pay for his expenses by obtaining a scholarship/fellowship
or a loan, and zero otherwise.
8. Results
We report the estimates of the multinomial logit model
based on the TM data and the Science data separately in
Tables 5a and 5b. The base category is education in the
TM data and health in the Science data. We are primarily
interested in estimating the impact of a change in parental
income on relative risk ratio of choosing a given major rela-
tive to the base category, controlling for other determinants
described in Section 4. We present two sets of results; one
without university dummies, and one with dummies for
over 70 universities.
The coefficients on the natural logarithm of income,
which are calculated as exp( ˆ̌ ), represent the impact of a
percentage increase in income on the relative risk ratio (the
probability of choosing each major relative to the base cat-
egory), so that a coefficient of one for a given major means
that increasing income has no impact on choosing that
major relative to the base category whereas a coefficient
above one implies a positive and a coefficient below one a
negative impact. In Table 5a, without university dummies,
the coefficient on income for a student who chose busi-
ness major is about 1.98. This means that a 100% increase
in parental income will increase the relative risk ratio by
98%. In other words, doubling parental income almost dou-
bles the probability of majoring in business relative to the
probability of majoring in education.
We find that a student whose father is self-employed is
about 60% more likely to choose business major as opposed
to the education major. Also interestingly, a student whose
father is covered by public sector social security is almost
50% less likely to choose business over education.17 Father’s
education, which is a measure of parental ability that is
likely to be correlated across generations, increases the rel-
ative probability of choosing business over education. Thisof selection into occupation in the public sector, state owned enterprises
or private sector in Turkey, she found that for an individual the presence
of a household member (father or other) who is employed in a given sec-
tor increases significantly the probability of choosing an occupation in the
same sector. This finding indicates the importance of passing on know-














Determinants of choosing a college major in the Turkish-Math data. Multinomial logit model:base category:education.
Without university dummies With university dummies
Business Econ-Pol-IR Law Social Sciences Literature Business Econ-Pol-IR Law Social Sciences Literature
Income (In) 1.977*** 1.884*** 1.750*** 1.891*** 1.151 1.638*** 1.761*** 1.385*** 1.699*** 1.145
(0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13)
Father self-employed 1.604*** 0.999 1.345** 0.998 0.868 1.492** 0.971 1.307* 0.8 0.8
(0.18) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) (0.18) (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.13)
Father public ss 0.499*** 0.627*** 1.02 0.538*** 0.675* 0.525*** 0.643*** 1.15 0.423*** 0.600*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.17) (0.07) (0.12)
Father private ss 1.39 0.94 0.81 0.668** 0.73 1.578* 0.95 0.90 0.74 0.80
(0.25) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.30) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16)
Father’s education 1.208*** 1.142*** 1.217*** 1.170*** 1.029 1.218*** 1.162*** 1.190*** 1.169** 1.113
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Male 3.895*** 3.189*** 1.928*** 1.128 0.923 3.954*** 3.483*** 1.598*** 1.402** 1.133
(0.39) (0.27) (0.17) (0.11) (0.12) (0.45) (0.34) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
No.of siblings 0.732*** 0.830*** 0.981 0.808*** 0.935 0.775*** 0.859** 1.017 0.803*** 0.991
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Tutoring hours 1.000* 1.000*** 1.001*** 1.000 1.001* 1.000* 1.000** 1.000** 1.000 1.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Times exam taken 1.068 1.058 0.713*** 1.280*** 1.154* 1.130* 1.035 0.693*** 1.443*** 1.221**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
OSS score 1.026*** 1.039*** 1.089*** 0.968*** 0.928*** 1.048*** 1.054*** 1.122*** 0.929*** 0.907***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population (In) 1.303*** 1.326*** 1.042 1.265*** 1.143*** 1.291*** 1.338*** 0.994 1.256*** 1.137**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
University dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.39
Number of Observations 6420 6412
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2002 OSS data.
Note: We exclude the students who have indicated open university or evening programs as their first choice. Values reported show how much the relative risk ratios (=exp(ˇ)) change in response to an increase
in the regressors.
* Statistical significance at 1%.
** Statistical significance at 5%.














Determinants of choosing a college major in the science data. Multinomial logit model:base category:health.
Without university dummies With university dummies
Education Business icon-Pol-IR Engineering Science Education Business Econ-Pol-IR Engineering Science
Income (In) 0.840** 2.161*** 2.327*** 1.426*** 1.249*** 0.857* 1.874*** 2.160*** 1.353*** 1.179*
(0.05) (0.22) (0.34) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.22) (0.35) (0.09) (0.09)
Father self-employed 0.782** 1.406* 0.76 1.183* 0.937 0.790* 1.328 0.66 1.204 0.929
(0.06) (0.21) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.22) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10)
Father public ss 1.08 0.584** 0.550** 0.649*** 0.711*** 1.13 0.71 0.67 0.765** 0.83
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.08) (0.10)
Father private ss 0.93 1.06 0.79 1.01 0.86 0.89 1.06 0.72 0.96 0.80
(0.09) (0.24) (0.23) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.26) (0.22) (0.12) (0.11)
Father’s education 0.866*** 1.120* 1.046 1.077** 0.920** 0.840*** 1.101 1.04 1.059 0.912**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
Male 1.082 2.631*** 2.218*** 5.312*** 1.789*** 1.243** 3.90*** 3.593*** 7.519*** 2.628***
(0.07) (0.34) (0.40) (0.35) (0.14) (0.10) (0.58) (0.69) (0.66) (0.25)
No.of siblings 1.075* 0.92 0.760** 0.798*** 0.832*** 1.003 1.029 0.9 0.881** 0.92
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04)
Tutoring hours 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Times exam taken 0.965 0.745** 1.159 0.996 1.395*** 0.957 0.976 1.389* 1.123 1.665***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.16) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.21) (0.07) (0.11)
OSS score 0.961*** 0.959*** 0.964*** 0.992*** 0.932*** 0.939*** 0.913*** 0.917*** 0.951*** 0.895***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Population (In) 0.930*** 1.263*** 1.428*** 1.211*** 1.250*** 0.934** 1.219*** 1.384*** 1.218*** 1.267***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.10) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04)
University dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.37
Number of Observations 8925 8870
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2002 OSS data.
Note: We exclude the students who have indicated open university or evening programs as their first choice. Values reported show how much the relative risk ratios (=exp(ˇ)) change in response to an increase
in the regressors.
* Statistical significance at 1%.
** Statistical significance at 5%.



























































titative scores are used since engineering and most health
degrees require OSS quantitative score, which is based on
math and science test scores of students. We again present
results with and without university dummies. Since con-A. Caner, C. Okten / Economics of
o be self-employed, father’s self-employment status has
lso a positive impact on the relative probability of choos-
ng law major over education. Given that law graduates
ave the option to start their private law practices which is
form of self-employment, this result is not unexpected.
Given our theoretical framework, we expect father’s
ublic sector social security status to decrease the rela-
ive probability of choosing majors that lead to careers
n private sector as opposed to the education major that
eads to a career in the public sector. This is indeed what
e find econometrically. The relative probability of choos-
ng almost all majors over education decreases for those
ith fathers that have public social security status. The only
xception is the law major for which there is no significant
ifference. Note that legal professionals have lower unem-
loyment rates than managers and economists according
o Turkish 2000 Census statistics (Table 2). Furthermore,
aw majors who choose to become judges and prosecu-
ors are employed by the public sector. Hence, the relative
ob security of law majors and the potential for public sec-
or employment may make law a desirable major for those
ith public sector job preferences.
Interestingly, father’s private social security status vari-
ble does not have a statistically significant impact on
hoosing business, Econ-Pol-IR, law or literature over edu-
ation, although the magnitude of the effect is quite large
or business majors. (The omitted category is father’s not
aving any social security). This is in sharp contrast with the
ffect that we observe for the father’s public social security
ariable. This could be due to the fact that the ownership
ate of some sort of private sector social security is quite
igh, so that the effect of this variable is hard to distinguish
rom the effect of a constant. Regardless, this strengthens
ur argument that father’s job preferences as measured
y his public sector social security status plays an impor-
ant role in the student’s choice of a major that leads to
ublic sector (or low unemployment risk) employment as
pposed to a major that leads to private sector employ-
ent.
Parental income also increases the relative risk ratio of
hoosing Econ-Pol-IR over education consistent with the
vidence presented in Section 5 that Econ-Pol-IR is a higher
eturn higher risk major relative to education. Although we
o not have any data on the labor market outcomes of social
cience graduates, the similarity in coefficient estimates
o those of Econ-Pol-IR suggests that careers in these two
reas have similar return and risk characteristics. Parental
ncome does not affect the relative risk ratio of choosing
iterature over education. This is not very surprising given
hat many literature graduates seek employment as teach-
rs and hence the two majors are likely to have similar
abor income streams. However, in order to be employed
s public school teachers, literature graduates are required
o complete a Master’s program in pedagogy which lowers
he present discounted value of potential earnings. Hence
e would expect the literature major to be less desirablehan teaching. Consistent with our expectations, students
ho choose this major are likely to have lower OSS scores
elative to education.
It is important to note that, the OSS score, which is the
nly determinant of a student’s placement in a univer-n Review 29 (2010) 1060–1075 1073
sity program, is statistically significant in all regressions.
One can interpret this result in two ways: First, if OSS
score measures a component of ability, then, consistent
with the theoretical prediction, higher ability individuals
choose high-risk high return careers such as business over
education. Second, the OSS score may be a constraint on
major choice. If this is the case, then it appears that less
constrained students (those with higher scores) choose
business over education. However, economically, the mag-
nitude of the effect is rather small. For example, a 1 point
increase in the OSS score makes a student more likely to
choose business over education by only 2.6 percent.18 The
small economic significance of this result may also be due
to lack of university level controls.
Hence, in our second set of results, we control for uni-
versity dummies for over seventy universities. While there
is some change in the magnitude of the coefficients, our
results essentially remain the same. For example, the coef-
ficient on parental income changes from 1.98 to 1.64, while
the coefficient on father’s self-employment status changes
from 1.60 to 1.49 for the business major. As expected, the
impact of OSS score on the relative probability of choosing
a specific major over education increases – from 2.6% to
8.4% – once we control for university dummies. Although
the effect is larger than previously, its economic impact is
still small compared to the impact of income or other father
specific variables. There does not seem to be a significant
effect of private tutoring hours on the choice between busi-
ness and education majors. The results on the OSS score and
tutoring hours support our suggestion that, business does
not first order stochastically dominate education.
The estimates for other control variables are consistent
with our observations of descriptive statistics. Being male,
having a more educated father, having fewer siblings, or
coming from a more populated area all increase the relative
probability of choosing business over education consistent
with our theoretical predictions. In summary, controlling
for university dummies, the students’ choice set as well as
a number of socio-economic characteristics, we are able to
pin down the importance of parental income, father’s self-
employment status and father’s social security status on
choosing careers that are perceived to have riskier income
streams.
We next turn our attention to the university applicants
that are from the science field of their high schools. The
estimates for these students are presented in Table 5b. Here
our categories are Education, Business, Econ-Pol-IR, Engi-
neering, Science and Health (the base category). Our control
variables are the same as in Table 5a with the exception that
private tutoring hours for math and science and OSS quan-18 In 2002, a 1-point increase in the OSS score represented a 0.3–1 per-
centile increase in the ranking of the student (OSYM, 2002). This would
mean that a 1-point increase in the OSS score enabled the candidate to
get ahead of 510–1700 students in the ranking. Since departmental quo-
tas are in the vicinity of 50–200, such a small difference in the OSS score
can have great implications for the student’s admittance.
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trolling for university dummies gives us more conservative
estimates we discuss only these results.
Our results show that increasing income by 100%
increases the relative probability of choosing engineering
over health by 35%. Increasing income by 100% increases
the relative probability of choosing business by 87% while it
decreases the probability of choosing education over health
by 14%. The coefficient on education is significant only at
10%. Hence the effect of income on the relative probability
of choosing education over health is small, and provides
further evidence on the similarity of these two majors in
terms of their public sector employment prospects and low
risk income streams.
As students from the science field typically choose
majors in health, engineering and science, there are
not too many observations for business and Econ-Pol-
IR majors (303 for business, 146 for Econ-Pol-IR) in the
science data. When we include over 70 university dum-
mies, naturally some of the significant coefficients become
insignificant. For example, the positive impact of father’s
self-employment status on choosing business which was
significant in the regression without university dum-
mies, becomes insignificant once university dummies are
included. Hence we do not want to make too much of our
results on business and Econ-Pol-IR in these estimations.
We present them mainly to have similar majors across
Tables 5a and 5b.
Interestingly, father’s self-employment status does not
have any impact on choosing engineering over health
major. But father’s public sector social security status
decreases the probability of choosing engineering over
health by 23%. Increasing the OSS score by 1 point decreases
the relative probability of choosing engineering over health
by 0.5%. The estimates for the other control variables are
similar to those for the TM data. In particular, being male,
having a more educated father, having fewer siblings, or
coming from a more populated area increases the relative
probability of choosing engineering over health.
8.1. Further robustness checks
8.1.1. Measurement error in income
Since data on parental income are based on a survey
of students, and students may apply for financial aid if
they are accepted to a program, there is some concern that
those who intend to apply for aid may underreport their
income. Hence we have re-done our estimations by exclud-
ing students that choose the lowest category of income
on the survey questionnaire. Both the statistical and eco-
nomic significance of our results remain fairly comparable.
If anything, the economic significance of parental income is
higher when the lowest income students are omitted from
the regression. Results are not shown but available upon
request.
8.1.2. Controlling for the transmission of father’s job
preferences to the offspring
Here we restrict the sample to students whose fathers
are at most high school graduates. By doing this, we restrict
the effect of parental job preferences on the child’s career
choice, presuming that a college degree will enable theon Review 29 (2010) 1060–1075
child to choose a different career from his/her less educated
father. The results essentially remain the same. The only
noteworthy difference is that father’s self-employment sta-
tus no longer has any effect on the choice of law major over
education. This is expected since by restricting data in this
way we drop fathers who have their own law practices.
These results are not shown but available upon request.
8.1.3. Model specification
We have estimated our regressions using the multino-
mial probit model. Marginal effects from the multinomial
logit model and the multinomial probit model are esti-
mated and found to be very similar. We have also estimated
an ordinary logit model where we restricted sample to edu-
cation and business majors in the TM data and health and
engineering majors in the Science data. The coefficients for
business and engineering majors are very similar to their
counterparts in the multinomial logit model. These two
sets of results are not presented here but available upon
request.
8.1.4. Credit constraints
We test for the possibility that credit constraints may
influence major choice by using a dummy variable which
is equal to 1 if the student indicated that he plans to pay
for his expenses by obtaining a scholarship/fellowship or
a loan, and zero otherwise. While the coefficients on other
variables remain essentially the same, the credit variable
is not significant in regressions. Hence students who plan
to obtain these fellowships/loans are not more likely to
choose education over other majors. Results are not shown
but available upon request.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we find strong evidence that in Turkey
family income, father’s self-employment and social secu-
rity status are important determinants of choosing a major
with a higher labor income risk such as business over a less
risky one such as education or health.
The impact of parental income and risk on career
choice has important policy implications for countries
with significant income inequalities. Poor students may
be systematically more likely to avoid risky human cap-
ital investments, even if these investments entail high
expected personal returns. To the extent that high per-
sonal returns also imply high social returns, it may be
efficient for governments to provide larger subsidies for
these investments to poor students. Furthermore, if poor
students are less likely to undertake educational invest-
ments that entail high risk and high expected return, initial
differences in family income may cause long-run economic
inequality that persists for generations. This insight adds
another reason for government involvement in the educa-
tion sector.Appendix A. Appendix
Table A1
A. Caner, C. Okten / Economics of Educatio
Table A1
OLS regression estimates of monthly compensation on individual and












Dummy: father primary school graduate 1018.533
(736.11)
Dummy: father junior high school graduate 745.8175
(790.55)
Dummy: father high school graduate 1082.336
(729.17)
Dummy: father vocational school graduate 834.5121
(779.77)
Dummy: father university graduate 1314.737*
(713.07)
Dummy: father master’s degree 1523.697**
(737.46)


















* Statistical significance at 10%.
** Statistical significance at 5%.
*** Statistical significance at 1%.
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